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Abstract: Corporate governance has been widely debated for over a decade with the collapse 
of the financial and capital market under the prejudicial roles of regulatory bodies. Therefore, the 
study examined the impact of corporate governance on firm value in Bangladesh. A total of 63 DSE-
listed companies from 2005 to 2019 consisting of 8,505 observations on an average of 15 years 
were chosen. The subsequent tests for the given data were conducted to identify the appropriate 
panel data analysis method for adjusted diagnostic problems. In the specific panel data, the Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) was utilised following the application of the random effects method 
to control econometric limitations. It was revealed that corporate governance lowered firm value 
when the board structure was familially and politically affiliated and led by CEO-duality. Moreover, 
the inclusion of dynamic professionals and independent members in the board structure increased 
the firm value. The use of the corporate governance code was proven to be highly challenging 
due to the participation of political and family leaders in corporate firms. Additionally, proper law 
enforcement was required to ensure transparency and accountability, thus reflecting firm value. 
As previous studies on corporate governance were conducted on a small scale and partial to the 
context of developing countries, this paper contributes a novel value in identifying and resolving 
the corporate governance crisis by reforming the board structure with diverse and professional 
directors. The regulatory bodies require improvement by including autonomous professional and 
independent members to exercise the corporate governance code.
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Introduction
Corporate governance has been a critical issue 
focused by regulatory bodies, policymakers, 
and academicians to improve the economic 
and sustainability conditions in developing 
countries for over a decade (Brown et al., 
2011; Wintoki et al., 2012; Claessens, 
2006). Additionally, the collapse of corporate 
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governance has compromised the government 
legally, financially, and economically, resulting 
in a lack of accountability in Bangladesh. An 
organised financial system includes proper 
asset allocation, fund abuse prevention, 
minority interest protection, and timely dividend 
payment to improve the corporate governance 
system and enable corporate laws to enhance 
firm value (La Porta, 2006). In a competitive 
global market, a robust regulatory framework is 
required to mandate organisational compliance 
involving policies and procedures to ensure 
accountability (Uddin et al., 2019). In corporate 
governance practices, firms could ensure 
proper resource distributions among various 
stockholders to efficiently deliver supplies and 
managerial functions in competing against 
global market shares (Uddin et al., 2019). 
Consequently, corporate governance practices 
increased the investors’ confidence in stock 
market stability by committing to financial and 
management services, such as regular AGM, 
dividends, information, and accountabilities 
through sound financial policies. The absence 
of sound financial policies would prevent 
firms from gaining the faith of suppliers, 
lenders, governmental and regulatory bodies, 
employees, and investors and may eventually 
collapse.
Given the severe corporate governance 
issues in Bangladesh, the government and 
public were unethically motivated to implement 
unauthorised frameworks for personal 
gains. The subsequent conflict between the 
government and the people led to the power-
wielding of the current government through 
an army-backed government conspiracy in 
2009. The previous (army-backed) government 
wrested power from the acting government 
through the pressure of arms and ruled 
Bangladesh from 2006 to 2008. Although 
Bangladesh was established as a democratic 
country in 1971, the country was seldom 
ruled by a democratic government. The power 
struggle among political parties resulted in 
corruption, unethical profit-making, and the use 
of power that led to the collapse of the capital 
market (Uddin et al., 2019). Regarding political 
connections, firms and institutions were owned 
and managed by a few persons, families, or 
institutions, thus defying corporate governance 
rules and regulations which controlled the 
global impact of corporate sectors. As such, the 
current governance issue raised two questions: 
(i) how a flawed corporate governance system 
could impact the economy and firm value and 
(ii) how the current corporate governance 
system could improve firm value. In response 
to both questions, the paper examines the 
corporate governance impact on firm value in 
Bangladesh.
Corporate governance connects good 
management and firm value by allowing 
ownership separation and conflict management 
to lessen agency issues (Céspedes et al., 
2010; dos Santos Silva et al., 2011). Hence, the 
board could play an intermediary role between 
the management team and shareholders 
with responsibilities involving supervision, 
replacing executives with poor performance, 
adapting sound financial policies, and ensuring 
accountabilities. With the coordination of 
functional responsibilities and delegation of 
board duties, managers would improve and 
enhance the value of the corporate governance 
status. Weekes-Marshall (2014) argued that 
managers undertaking corporate affairs with 
honesty, sincerity, efficiency, and transparency 
increased the faith of stakeholders and 
enhanced firm value. On the contrary, 
a board and financial managers with no active 
compliance to corporate governance ethics 
may result in the collapse of firm value.
Although several studies examined 
corporate governance through cross-sectional 
country analyses in developed economies, 
corporate governance emerged as a pandemic 
in developing countries such as Bangladesh. 
For example, Mitton (2002) conducted a study 
on five Asian countries to show the specific 
effects of corporate governance on financial 
performance and significantly contributed to 
corporate financial performance. Additionally, 
Haque et al. (2011) reviewed the initial effort on 
corporate governance using primary data which 
obscured the main influential variables, such 
as board size, board composition, institutional 
shareholdings, and managerial ownership. 
As previous cross-sectional study analyses 
in developed countries failed to capture the 
individual analysis of developing countries, 
the gap identification proved advantageous in 
analysing and comparing among individual, 
cross-country, developed, and undeveloped 
countries regarding the corporate governance 
impact on firm value. For example, Joh (2003) 
examined the effect of corporate governance 
on Korean firms and found a decline in financial 
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performance. Therefore, a cross-sectional 
analysis may not be appropriate for individual 
policy implications.
This paper includes 63 DSE-listed 
manufacturing companies in Bangladesh for the 
following reasons: (i) The listed companies led 
the economy and supplied all the systematic data 
related to corporate governance in the annual 
reports from 2005 to 2019; (ii) Manufacturing 
companies were the mainstream of economic 
growth, production, and employment creation. 
The manufacturing sector played a significant 
role in providing basic public needs and 
economic sustenance; (iii) A significant number 
of investors invested capital in the companies. 
The influence of corporate performance on 
investment would impact the Bangladeshi stock 
market that has collapsed in recent times with 
the decline in corporate governance (Weekes-
Marshall, 2014); (iv) An impetus for conducting 
the study on manufacturing companies to 
provide more significant job opportunities for 
unemployed Bangladeshis.
Hence, the main contributions of the paper 
include: (i) A new test result involving corporate 
governance impact on firm value in developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, as opposed 
to the cross-country analyses in developed 
countries in previous studies. Provided 
that no suitable estimation method for data 
analysis was applied In Bangladesh or other 
developing countries (Wintoki et al., 2012), 
a proper estimation technique was performed 
to adjust the diagnostic issues of the data set. 
Regarding the data set type, Torres-Reyna 
(2007) and Beck and Katz (1995) utilised PSCE 
for the data inclusion of serial correlations, 
heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional 
problems as the conclusion. (ii) The previous 
studies on corporate governance and firm value 
in Bangladesh were inconsequential, partial, 
and grounded on primary data within limited 
scope and methods (Haque et al., 2011); (iii) 
A new estimation factor concerning the impact 
of corporate governance on firm value was 
considered to highlight the ownership nature 
of Bangladeshi families and political leaders 
due to the severity and uncontrollability of the 
corporate governance issue. Therefore, this 
paper presents new and imperative evidence 
regarding corporate governance impact on firm 
value in Bangladesh.
The paper is structured as follows: 
Section 1 describes the relevant literature and 
hypotheses development; Section 2 elaborates 
on theory, variable definitions, data collection, 
and methodology; Section 3 ascertains 
the findings and analysis of results in the 
Bangladesh context. Finally, the paper draws to 
a conclusion with policy implications.
1. Relevant Literatures and 
Hypotheses
1.1 Determinants of Corporate 
Governance and the Impact on Firm 
Value, Research Hypotheses
Board Size and Firm Value
Board size is defined as the length of the board 
structure linked to firm value. Larger board 
structure increases the complexity in decision-
making. Although no link was identified 
between the board structure and firm value in 
several studies on listed corporate firms using 
OLS (Rouf, 2011; Rashid et al., 2010), Gill et 
al. (2011) reported a negative link between 
corporate governance and firm value in 
examining listed Canadian firms. Additionally, 
Carter et al. (2003) revealed a positive and 
significant impact of corporate governance on 
firm value.
Pucheta-Martínez (2015) argued that 
most of the previous studies accepted the 
agency theory to explain the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm value 
creation. Nevertheless, a mixed approach 
could be adapted to describe the link between 
corporate governance and firm value following 
the stewardship theory. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is developed from the theoretical 
background:
H1: Board size can negatively influence firm 
value.
Board Composition and Firm Value
The agency theory argues that the consideration 
of external directors in board composition 
would reduce agency issues through a strong 
monitoring role (Cheng, 2008). External 
executives are typically efficient individuals 
from other organisations with the expertise 
to control the current organisation. The 
appointment of external executives to the board 
positively influenced corporate governance and 
firm value (Nguyen & Faff, 2007; Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2006).
Several previous studies examined the 
link between board composition and firm 
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value (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). For 
example, Combs et al. (2007) found an inverse 
relationship between board composition 
and the stock market that may not benefit 
shareholders. Nonetheless, some studies 
indicated the absence of a link between 
board composition and firm value (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat & Black, 2001). Based 
on the theoretical and empirical discussions, 
the following hypothesis is developed:
H2: Board composition positively leads to 
firm value.
Managerial Ownership and Firm Value Link
The agency theory predicts that diverse 
managerial ownership acts results in improved 
shareholder interest. The dual owner-manager 
role would involve more functional activities 
to control the firm in creating shareholder 
values. Kumar and Singh (2013) estimated 
that the positive link between ownership and 
firm value changed through managers and firm 
value or performance. Additionally, Lee et al. 
(2008) estimated that managers worked more 
to enhance firm value by forming managerial 
ownership.
Acharya and Bisin (2009) also demonstrated 
that managerial ownership provided more 
incentive for managers to positively change firm 
value. The result concluded that managerial 
shareholdings on the board had a decisive role 
in firm value. Thus, the option of purchasing 
shares in firms would mitigate the agency 
problem and aid in maximising firm value (Kumar 
& Singh, 2012). The following hypothesis is 
developed based on the theoretical ground:
H3: Managerial ownership leads to 
enhanced firm value.
Institutional Ownership and Firm Value
The agency cost theory predicts that the conflict 
between shareholders and managers reduces 
firm value. Additionally, strong corporate 
governance could reduce agency cost through 
technical management between shareholders 
and managers. For example, Wei et al.’s (2005) 
study on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm value in 5,284 Chinese 
companies indicated an inverse relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm value.
In contrast, Navissi and Naiker (2006) 
who evaluated the relationship between 
institutional shareholdings and firm value in 
123 companies found no impact of institutional 
shareholdings on firm value. The effect of 
institutional ownership on firm value depended 
on the nature of institutions, such as banks 
or investment companies and organisational 
control (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 
2011). The following hypothesis is developed 
from the previous discussion:
H4: A contrary relationship exists between 
institutional ownership and firm value.
Board Independence and Firm Value
McCabe and Nowak (2008) examined the 
impact of independent directors on the board 
in Australian listed companies by interviewing 
30 directors. It was agreed that the participation 
of independent directors induced a balance of 
power and defended companies from partial 
decisions. Following the corporate governance 
code in Malaysian firms, 33% of independent 
directors are required on the board. Nevertheless, 
the internal control of firms failed to be monitored 
(Wooi & Ming, 2009). In American companies, 
a significant percentage of directors on the board 
were independent directors who monitored and 
controlled the firms.
An inverse relationship between 
independent directors and the firm value was 
identified (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Besides, 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) reported 
that independent directors on the board would 
intervene in managerial functions and cause 
more adverse outcomes. Lefort and Urzúa 
(2008) evaluated panel data in 160 companies 
to measure the relationship between board 
independence and firm value and reported 
a positively significant relationship between 
board independence and firm value. The 
increased participation of independent directors 
on board meetings reduced agency conflicts, 
thus leading to the following hypothesis:
H5: Board independence is positively related 
to firm value.
CEO Duality and Firm Value
Based on the agency theory, the board should be 
distinguished from the management to control 
and monitor managerial functions. A dually 
responsible leader may gain dictatorship that 
may negatively influence firm value. Despite 
the negative attitudes to firm performance, 
several management theories argued that joint 
leadership provided a significantly positive 
relationship between CEO duality and firm 
value. In Baliga et al. (1996), the correlation 
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between CEO duality and firm performance 
indicated a significant relationship between 
CEO duality and company performance. 
Yan Lam and Kam Lee (2008) investigated 
a study on 128 listed companies in Hong 
Kong to identify the relationship between CEO 
duality and accounting performance. The result 
revealed that dual leaders performed better in 
non-family oriented firms than family-based 
firms. In contrast, Boyd (1995) indicated no 
significant link between CEO duality and firm 
value. Peng et al. (2007) examined the impact 
of CEO duality on the financial analysis of 403 
listed Chinese firms and found a significant 
connection between CEO duality and company 
performance in China. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is developed:
H6: CEO duality negatively influences firm 
value.
Firm Size and Firm Value
Firm size may involve exploring the financial 
benefits of a larger firm with a wide acquisition 
scope to derive financial services and vice 
versa. Regarding firm size, Cheng et al. 
(2010) revealed an inverse relationship 
between firm size and firm value, whereas 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicated a positive 
relationship between firm size and firm value 
in disclosing symmetrical information for more 
diversified products and services. Additionally, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) found that a more 
significant firm created a higher confidence 
level and lesser bankruptcy, thus increasing the 
market share demands. As such, the following 
hypothesis is developed:
H7: There is a positive relationship between 
firm size and firm value.
Profitability and Firm Value
Following the trade-off theory arguing that more 
profitable firms would create more firm value, 
Myers (2001) anticipated a positive correlation 
between profitability and firm value. The trade-
off theory demonstrated the inverted relationship 
between leverage use and firm value, whereas 
the pecking order theory suggested that firms 
focused on internal sources to use external 
financing, consequently resulting in a positive 
link between corporate profitability and firm 
value (Myers & Majluf, 1984). As such, the 
following hypothesis is developed:
H8: Profitability positively influences firm 
value.
Previous literature indicated mixed and 
vague results that may be irrelevant to 
developing countries due to the examination of 
cross-country and developed country analyses 
rather than individual or developing countries. 
Hence, an individual country analysis is needed 
for policy implications in providing specific 
characteristics to be adapted in developing 
countries. To date, the relevant studies are 
confined to the few and partial study scopes, 
methods, and results. Although developing 
countries raised primary concerns of corporate 
governance issues involving corruption, lack of 
democracy, illiteracy rates, and poverty, most 
of the studies were conducted in developed 
countries. In light of the indicated study gaps, 
this study investigates the influence of corporate 
governance on firm value in Bangladesh.
2. Theoretical Framework, Variables 
Definition,	and	Model	Specification
2.1 Theoretical Framework That 
Explains the Link between Corporate 
Governance and Firm Value
A theoretical framework was established 
to demonstrate how corporate governance 
impacted firm value. Musa et al. (2019) 
revealed that the corporate governance index 
positively marked the debt policy. In this vein, 
an increase in corporate governance attributes 
would enhance the debt level to maximise 
firm value. Corporate governance disclosure 
may have positive, negative, or no influence 
to firm value. A board size or board structure 
involved the number of member types on the 
board to monitor or control internal functions. 
Thus, board size was expected to negatively 
influence the firm value as a large board size 
led to complexity in decision-making, thus 
resulting in high management cost.
Board composition also influenced 
the proportion of external executives to 
the total number of directors classified as 
functional and non-functional directors. 
External executives were considered efficient 
individuals or experts from other organizations 
that positively contributed an outstanding 
performance to the board. A significant ratio 
of external directors was anticipated to 
positively influence firm value. In avoiding 
the unethical issues of the corporate world, 
the corporate governance code mandated 
the appointment of a percentage of total 
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members on the board to facilitate board 
independence and demonstrate operational 
transparency and accountability. Therefore, 
a positive link is assumed between board 
independence and firm value. Furthermore, 
institutional shareholders comprised of block 
shareholders who dominated the board 
meeting and influenced firm value. Based 
on joint leadership, CEO duality positively 
or negatively impacted firm value and could 
reduce the conflict between managers and 
shareholders as an intermediary agent. The 
relationship was also affirmed by the agency 
theory regarding the conflicting interests 
between owners or principles and managers 
or agents (Robert, 2005). The following figure 




The econometrics model for measuring the 
relationship between corporate governance 
instruments and the firm value was developed 
by Rashid and Islam (2013) as shown below:
MBV = B0 + B1BS + B2BC + B3IO + 
+ B4MNO + B5BI + B6FS + B7ROA + 
+ B8Duality + e
2.3 Data Collection Strategy and 
Methodology
A total of 63 DSE-listed companies were 
chosen from 2005 to 2019 consisting of 8,505 
observations on an average of 15 years. The 
data obtained from the financial disclosures 
of the 63 companies included financial 
statements, cash flow statements, financial 
statement notes, and share market prices 
from the historical data cell record of DSE in 
Bangladesh. The samples were chosen from 
all the listed companies based on uninterrupted 
disclosures and subsequent market share 
tradings during the studied period. Besides, 
the study period ranged between 2005 and 
2019 based on the uninterrupted data of the 
Fig. 1: Relationship between independent variables and firm value
Source: own
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chosen companies. Companies that began 
operating after 2005 were excluded from this 
study. The financial sector for different typical 
assets, functions, regulatory requirements, 
and capital rules involving manufacturing was 
also excluded (Diamond & Rajan, 2000). In the 
econometric model, the firm value was followed 
by Tobin’s Q ratio as a good proxy in measuring 
firm value.
Corporate governance variables, such as 
board size, board composition, managerial 
ownership, board independence, and CEO 
duality were used to estimate corporate 
governance and control variables (firm size 
and profitability). All the variables were 
computed from various components of financial 
disclosures regarding sample firms from 2005 
to 2019. Other necessary information was 
obtained from the Bureau of Statistics and 
the Bangladesh Bank website. The collected 
data covered the 12 economic sectors in 
Bangladesh, namely, Cement, Ceramic, 
Engineering, Food and Allied, Fuel and Power, 
Information Technology, Jute and Textile, Paper 
and Printing, Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, 
Service and Real Estate, Tannery and Footwear, 
and Miscellaneous industries.
2.4 Methodology
The panel estimation to control the 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
problems invariantly continued over time. The 
subsequent panel data strategies were applied 
to develop the research purpose in terms of 
the panel ordinary least square, fixed effects, 
and random effects method. For example, 
Hausman (1978) indicated the random effect 
model as a suitable data analysis method. The 
data set managed possible serial correlation 
issues, heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional 
problems. In the specific panel data, Beck and 
Variables Description Measurement  of variables Empirical studies
Dependent 
variable
M/B Market to book 
value
Market value/Book value Adeyemi et al., 2011; 
Fumani & Moghadam, 
2015; Alfiet al., 2016
Independent 
variables
BS Board size Number of total directors Bhagat & Black, 2001; 










La Porta et al., 2006; 
Baek et al., 2004;  










Erickson & Wang, 1999; 
Lefort & Urzúa, 2008; 
Duchin et al., 2010
FS Firm (size, control 
variable)
Firm size (natural 
logarithm of total assets)
Titman & Wessels, 1988
ROA Return on asset 
(control variable)
Net profit/Total assets Alagathurai, 2013; 
Ehikioya, 2009
DUALITY CEO/Chair CEO duality (a dummy 
variable: takes 1 if both 
are the same person  
or 0 otherwise)
Fosberg, 2004;  
Abor & Biekpe, 2007
Source: own
Tab. 1: Variables measurement and empirical studies
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Katz (1995) allowed for the utilisation of PCSE to 
control the econometric limitations. Renowned 
researchers accepted the appropriateness and 
use of PCSE for panel data analysis through 
more than 2,000 citations worldwide in the Web 
of Science (Reed, 2017). Some pre-requisite 
tests were also performed before implementing 
the PCSE as described below:
Hausman (1978) test was introduced 
to discriminate between fixed effects and 
random effects in assessing the panel data 
set. Considering the study results, the random 
effects could be utilised in this study (Chi-
squared > p-value = 0.4623).
Serial correlation test was presumed 
that no serial correlation issue was found in 
the given panel data set. The tested results 
indicated Prob. > chi2 = 0.000 based on the 
serial correlation test performed. The null 
hypothesis was rejected due to the existence 
of the serial correlation issue, regardless of 
whether the residuals were serially correlated 
across time.
Heteroskedasticity test: Heteroskedasti-
city is a common phenomenon in panel data 
analysis with variance in error terms across 
observations. Although no heteroskedasticity 
in error terms was found, the results indicated 
Prob. > chi2 = 0.000. Hence, heteroskedasticity 
was reported in the data set.
Cross-sectional test was used to examine 
the absolute values of the cross-sectional 
correlations averaged on all the possible cross-
sectional pair units (Robertson & Symons, 
2000). Although it was assumed that no cross-
sectional issues existed in the data set, the 
p-value of 0.000 indicated a cross-sectional 
issue.
3. Empirical Results and Description
The section examines the impact of corporate 
governance on firm value in Bangladesh 
from 2005 to 2019. The consequential test 
of statistics was employed and described 
following the corporate finance theory and 
corporate governance code in Bangladesh as 
given below.
Tab. 2 presents the descriptive statistics 
of corporate governance variables and the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable 
mean value was 3.41, thus indicating that the firm 
value for sample companies was generally more 
significant than the book. Hence, companies 
were creating value for shareholders during the 
15 years. The average board size was 7.39 (the 
minimum is five but not exceeding 20), neither 
big nor small, and was generally more useful 
for the managerial decisions adapted by the 
corporate governance code. The mean value 
of the non-executive director was 47.2% and 
indicated a high percentage to control internal 
functions by external executives. It was found 
that the average shares held by organisations 
were a high 24.3%.
The mean of managerial shares was 
33.1%, thus revealing that managers were 
Variable Min. Max. Mean SD
FV 0.0219 62.19 3.413 5.914
BS 3.000 15.00 7.39 2.092
BC 0.000 0.909 0.472 0.251
IO 0.000 0.2831 0.243 0.219
MNO 0.000 1.000 0.331 0.224
BI 0.000 0.600 0.094 0.104
FS 9.634 24.284 20.066 2.159
ROA −0.410 0.479 0.0518 0.056
Duality 0 1.00 0.271 0.445
Source: own
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics result
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motivated to control organisations for 
shareholders’ interests. The mean participation 
of independent directors was a low 0.09 
compared to corporate governance (at least 
10%). The average firm size was a satisfactory 
20.06, whereas profitability was a low 5.18%. 
The average value of CEO duality was 0.27, 
hence demonstrating that 27% of the firms 
maintained CEO duality.
Tab. 3 presents the Pearson correlation 
coefficient to test the multicollinearity issues in 
the data set. Board size led to a positive and 
significant relationship with firm value, whereas 
a negative and significant relationship was 
indicated between board composition and firm 
value with a coefficient of −0.108. Regarding 
managerial ownership, a negative and 
significant relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value indicated that higher 
managerial ownership resulted in lower firm 
value. Additionally, board independence 
showed a significant negative relationship 
to firm value, hence revealing that higher 
participation of independent directors in board 
meetings reduced firm value. Therefore, firm 
size negatively influenced firm value. In the 
case of profitability, a significant and negative 
correlation between ROA and firm value was 
reported. Similarly, CEO duality negatively 
related to firm value with the coefficient of 
−0.119
In the multicollinearity issues, the VIF 
estimator indicated the range of value from 5 to 
10 (Gill et al., 2010). As the calculated R-square 
values were considered lesser than the given 
range, no multicollinearity issues were identified 
in the data analysis.
Tab. 4 reports the multiple regression 
analysis results using the random effects model. 
Board size was positively and significantly 
related to firm value. In this vein, a bigger board 
size positively influenced firm value and vice 
versa. Therefore, the research hypothesis on 
the negative connection between board size and 
firm value was rejected. It was also indicated 
that the relationship between board composition 
and firm value was negative and significant, thus 
revealing that a greater percentage of external 
directors on the board reduced firm value. 
Following the pecking order theory, firms that 
pooled internal and external funds led to fewer 
agency conflicts in enhancing firm value (Mayers, 
1984). Additionally, Wen et al. (2002) reported 
that a high rate of non-executive directors 
on the board reduced firm value. Hence, the 
research hypothesis on the link between board 
composition and firm value was rejected.
Concerning board independence, 
a significant role was detected between board 
independence and firm value. The positive 
relationship indicated that participating 
independent directors would enhance firm 
value. Independent directors provided an active 
role on the board to make accurate decisions 
FV BS BC IO MNO BI FS ROA Duality
FV 1.000
BS 0.106** 1.000
BC −0.108** 0.231** 1.000
IO −0.007 0.066* 0.074* 1.000
MNO −0.092* −0.006 0.014 −0.288** 1.000
BI 0.084** −0.005 −0.531** −0.161** −0.013 1.000
FS −0.274** −0.014 −0.019 −0.096** 0.228** 0.217** 1.000
ROA −0.389** 0.236** −0.020 0.029 −0.124** 0.002 −0.116** 1.000
Duality −0.119** −0.202** 0.182** 0.047 0.029 −0.184** −0.046 −0.186** 1.000
Source: own
Note: ** significant level at 1%, * significant level at 5%.
Tab. 3: Report of Pearson correlation matrix of variables
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for intense supervision and monitoring to 
properly sustain the firm. Based on the trade-off 
theory, well-governed firms had more access 
to debt money that could intensify firm value. 
McCabe and Nowak (2008) reported that a ratio 
was required for independent directors on the 
board for efficient organisational management. 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) indicated 
a negative relationship between the participating 
independent directors and firm value, as 
opposed to the study findings. Hence, the 
research hypothesis on the link between board 
independence and firm value was rejected.
Besides, the connection between 
institutional ownership and firm value was 
insignificant and implied that institutional 
ownership could not influence firm value. Navissi 
and Naiker (2006) revealed an insignificant link 
between institutional ownership and firm value 
in line with the study results. Wei et al. (2005) 
showed a positive and significant association 
between institutional ownership and firm value. 
Thus, the research hypothesis on the positive 
association between institutional shareholdings 
and firm value was rejected.
The study results revealed that managerial 
ownership had a positive and insignificant 
relationship with firm value and indicated that 
managerial participation in ownership was not 
regarded as a motivational force to influence 
firm value. However, Kumar and Singh (2013) 
and Lee et al. (2008) indicated a positive and 
significant approach between managerial 
ownership and firm value. Therefore, the 
research hypothesis on a positive and significant 
relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm value was rejected. Additionally, firm 
size had a negative and significant relationship 
with firm value and signified that organisational 
growth tended to reduce firm value. Large firms 
might have less control over management 
and services and caused a decline in firm 
value (Myers, 2001). Although the study result 
corresponded to Cheng et al. (2010), the 
result contradicted Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
Hence, the hypothesis of a positive correlation 
between firm size and firm value was rejected.
On the other hand, ROA or profitability 
was found to be positive and significant with 
the profitability to adapt to the finance theory 
(Mayers, 1977). Nevertheless, the hypothesis 
on the relationship between profitability and firm 
value was accepted. Finally, it was confirmed 
that CEO duality had no significant relationship 
Variable
Random effects model
Coefficient Std. error T-statistic P-value
Constant 8.661655 3.406669 2.542559 0.0112
BS 0.214043** 0.104934 2.039780 0.0417
BC −1.454648* 0.798014 1.454648 0.0686
BI 7.117421** 1.783990 3.989608 0.0001
IO −0.982449 0.972572 1.010155 0.3127
MNO 1.773337 1.249924 1.418756 0.1563
FS −0.438903** 0.162781 2.696281 0.0071
ROA 33.03788** 2.940975 11.23365 0.0000
Duality −0.247102 0.408537 0.604846 0.5454
R-squared 0.176402
Adjusted R-squared 0.169363




Tab. 4: Random effects model results
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with firm value. Joint leadership through 
CEO duality could not significantly perform 
managerial functions to enhance firm value 
(Foster, 2004). Regardless, Abor and Biekpe 
(2007) indicated a positive and significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm 
value. Therefore, more than 50% of predictors 
were found to be significant and indicated the 
efficient formation of the econometrics model.
Tab. 5 reports the estimates of results from 
PCSE-testing that showed the link between 
corporate governance and firm value. The result 
revealed a positive and significant board size 
effect at 0.1 coefficient and indicated a higher 
firm value with more efficient board size. For 
example, Musa et al. (2018) reported that 
board size (number of board members) linked 
to board authority effectiveness, company 
performance, and information asymmetry. 
A large board size consisted of many experts 
(in terms of knowledge and experience) in 
favour of the interests of a firm and could make 
the right decision to increase firm value.
According to the trade-off theory, a large 
board size influenced board decisions in 
borrowing more for the capital structure to 
obtain tax exemption and maximise firm value. 
Previous studies such as Carter et al. (2003) 
showed that a large board size enabled the 
board to make efficient decisions in enhancing 
firm value. However, contradictory results were 
supported by Gill et al. (2011). Therefore, the 
research hypothesis on a negative relationship 
between board size and firm value was rejected. 
Nonetheless, a negative and insignificant 
association between board composition and 
firm value was indicated in the study. As board 
composition pertained to member diversity 
involving qualification, experience, selection 
process, degree of autonomy, rationality, 
ethical values for meeting inputs that may 
improve corporate governance, and firm value, 
the insignificance could be based on the 
aforementioned facts.
It was also observed that board composition 
involved family and politically connected 
members who tended to impose board authority 
for personal interests. Previous studies 
such as Nguyen and Faff (2007) indicated 
a positive and significant connection between 
board composition and firm value. Diversity 
in board composition or structure resulted 
in higher board efficiency. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) revealed a weak correlation 
between board composition and firm value. 
Hence, the research hypothesis on a negative 
and significant relationship between board 
composition and firm value was rejected.
Concerning institutional ownership, 
a negative and insignificant correlation between 
institutional ownership and firm value revealed 
that institutional ownerships involving the board 
Variable
Panel corrected standard error (PCSE)
Coefficient Std. error Z-statistic P-value
Constant 10.04536 2.855397 3.52 0.0000
BS 0.3139443** 0.1064284 2.95 0.003
BC −0.8572218 0.87019 −0.99 0.325
IO −0.0840202 0.7500734 −0.11 0.911
MNO 0.2171515 1.161882 0.19 0.852
BI 3.080712 2.114194 1.46 0.145
FS −0.5076032*** 0.1359868 −3.73 0.000
ROA 31.51971*** 4.230150 7.45 0.000





Tab. 5: Results of panel corrected standard errors
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reduced firm value. The negative impact on firm 
value indicated that institutional shareholders 
blocked shareholdings by influencing the 
organisational decisions beyond the interests 
of the firm. However, previous studies indicated 
a negative and significant relationship between 
institutional shareholdings and firm value 
(Wei et al., 2005). Wei et al. (2005) reflected 
a positive and significant correlation between 
institutional ownership and firm value. Thus, 
the research hypothesis on a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm value was rejected.
Regarding managerial ownership, the 
results indicated that managerial ownership 
had a positive and insignificant relationship 
with firm value. Stock purchase options in 
gaining managerial ownership were not 
considered a motivational force for managers 
in the study (Kumar & Singh, 2013). On the 
contrary, managerial ownership was found to 
have a positive and significant relationship with 
firm value and provided a strategy to mitigate 
the agency problem (Kumar & Singh, 2012). 
Therefore, the research hypothesis on the 
association between managerial ownership 
and firm value was rejected.
Additionally, board independence had 
a positive and insignificant correlation with 
the firm. The reason for the insignificance 
in board independence involved the 
board minority selected through political 
considerations who could not influence the 
board meeting dominated by the board chair 
and CEO. Nevertheless, previous studies 
showed a positive and significant relationship 
between board independence and firm value. 
The participating independent director on 
the board played a strong monitoring role 
in management (McCabe & Nowak, 2008), 
whereas Bhagat and Black (2001) indicated 
a negative and significant relationship between 
board independence and firm value. Hence, the 
research hypothesis on a positive relationship 
between board independence and firm value 
was rejected.
The results indicated that firm size had 
a negative and significant effect on firm value, 
thus revealing that a firm with more diversity 
in products and services and challenges in 
controlling the managerial functions would 
incur a high cost and reduce firm value. 
Previous studies adopted the presumptions of 
this study (Myers, 2001). Additionally, Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) reported that company 
size was positively related to firm value. 
Hence, the hypothesis of a positive association 
between firm size and firm value was rejected. 
However, ROA or profitability had a positive 
and significant relationship with firm value. The 
finding was adapted to the finance theory such 
as the trade-off theory and predicted a positive 
relationship between profitability and firm value. 
Hence, the research hypothesis on a positive 
relationship between profitability and firm value 
was accepted.
The CEO duality showed an inverse 
association to firm value, indicating that firm 
value declined with the aggressive hold of power 
by the CEO through joint leadership. In the 
Bangladeshi context, having sole authority led to 
the exclusion of other board members in decision-
making. Using the board chair, decisions were 
made in favour of the CEO’s interests. It was 
observed that CEO duality usually occurred 
when family members and political persons held 
maximum shares. Following CEO duality, dual 
roles were established regardless of the minority 
interest in the corporation and considerably 
hampered the corporate governance system 
through familial and governmental connections 
beyond the rule of law. As such, previous 
research supported the study findings (Uwugbei, 
2014). Consequently, the research hypothesis 
on a positive relationship between CEO duality 
and firm value was rejected.
Concluding Remarks  
and Policy Implications
For a developing country such as Bangladesh, 
corporate governance is the most discussable 
issue among regulators, academicians, and 
policymakers. The recent corporate governance 
index has fallen due to the lack of democracy 
and corruption in the government. Therefore, 
the paper examined the impact of corporate 
governance on firm value. However, the 
results indicated that board structure positively 
influenced firm value as a strong board 
structure could supervise the managers and 
communicate with stakeholders on excellent 
financial, capital, and raw material management 
to enhance firm value.
Previous studies equally adopted the 
empirical results of the study (Gill et al., 2011; 
Carter et al., 2003). However, some previous 
studies opposed the finding. For example, 
Gill et al. (2011) reported that board size 
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had a negative relationship with firm value 
and argued that a large board size created 
complexities and conflicts that incurred 
agency and managerial costs, consequently 
reducing firm value. In contrast, a negative 
and insignificant relationship between board 
composition and firm value indicated that 
external directors could not effectively control 
the board and internal directors due to political 
affiliations in Bangladesh. No individual could 
exercise power over the political and family 
leaders currently linked to the Bangladeshi 
government (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). 
Hence, it was indicated that institutional 
ownership had a negative and insignificant 
relationship with firm value in line with previous 
studies (Wei et al., 2005).
Also, board independence was regarded 
as a non-functional body in family-oriented and 
politically-affiliated firms. Independent directors 
were politically appointed by the current 
government with no liberty to play an active 
role as reviewed in previous studies (Bhagat 
& Black, 2001). On the contrary, managerial 
ownership had a positive and insignificant 
association to firms, implying that managerial 
ownership did not motivate company operations 
if managers were not compensated based on 
status and investment (Kumar & Singh, 2013). 
In the two control variables concerned (firm size 
and profitability), firm size had an inverse and 
significant relationship with firm value.
In contrast, probability had a positive 
and significant relationship with firm value. 
Nevertheless, the most significant result was 
CEO duality with an inverse and significant 
association to firm value. A firm led by CEO 
duality in family-oriented and politically-
affiliated firms would decrease firm value. 
Politically-considered deeds in recent times, 
regardless of the free and fair management 
of the government, influenced corporate 
governance (Uddin et al., 2019). Implementing 
joint leadership through CEO duality would 
decrease firm value due to the advantageous 
position of using political and family-oriented 
power for corruption. The statement reflects 
the current practice in Bangladesh in line with 
previous study findings (Baliga et al., 1996).
Moreover, policy implications are required 
for strategic decisions. First, better legislations 
are necessary to improve the current corporate 
governance system by setting free and fair 
regulators. The current regulatory system 
is directed by the political consideration of 
the government for approval, registration, 
appointment, and as a monitoring system. In 
removing political affiliations from the regulatory 
system, the government requires professional 
directions to install a holistic regulatory body 
to improve the corporate governance system. 
Additionally, companies should be formed 
through dispersed shareholdings and the 
approval of companies free from political and 
family-oriented affiliations to ensure corporate 
governance. By enforcing company laws, firms 
can strictly comply with corporate governance 
rules and regulations internally in serving the 
mission, vision, and objectives and preventing 
personal or political gains.
Furthermore, independent directors should 
be increased to 30% of the total directors 
following developed countries like the USA to 
intervene in unethical issues on board meetings 
and provide valuable suggestions involving 
corporate governance. Besides, firms need 
board diversification with regards to qualification, 
knowledge, experience, rationality, moral 
values, sincerity, and decision-making power 
in supporting managers to follow corporate 
governance principles. Moreover, corporate 
governance acts should include a sufficient 
degree of freedom and power to professionally 
manage firms with corporate governance.
Despite the contribution of this paper, some 
limitations were identified for future research 
directions. Firstly, the study only included 
manufacturing companies which restricted the 
generalisation of results for policy directions. 
Therefore, future studies should include all 
types of listed companies in Bangladesh. 
Secondly, the study did not cover companies in 
the financial sector. Regardless, the corporate 
governance impact on the financial industry 
is considered indispensable in protecting the 
public interest. Hence, future studies should 
examine the corporate governance impact on 
financial and capital markets. Lastly, the study 
did not cover the roles of regulatory bodies in 
corporate governance quality involving listed 
companies, thus limiting the current study 
findings. Hence, future studies may be directed 
to the roles of regulatory bodies in corporate 
governance quality concerning Bangladeshi 
listed companies.
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